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ABSTRACT
The concept of public service motivation has been central to the discussion of 
motivation in the field of public management but has never been studied in 
international organizations.  This paper reports on a preliminary study of motivational 
issues within the European Commission, including motivation for entry and public 
service motivation.  Based on a survey distributed to the entire staff of the European 
Commission, supplemented by personal interviews, we demonstrate the importance of 
public service motivation within the Commission and explore the antecedents of 
public service motivation, including socio-demographic variables, organizational 
position, and entry motivation.  Results have significant implications for human 
resources management policy and efforts aimed at motivating staff.
INTRODUCTION
Research on the European Commission has evolved as the organization itself 
has grown and changed.  But only in this decade has the Commission itself focused 
seriously on its own management, as it put in place a major reform of its management 
systems and attempted to change the culture of management within the Commission, 
an effort that has not been without problems (Bauer, 2008).  Students of the EU have 
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followed that process, but primarily from a political science perspective, as an 
example of a successful reform process. (Kassim, 2004 and 2008).
What has been missing until lately is the perspective of public management
theory.  EU specialists are only recently starting to apply both public management and 
administrative science approaches (Bauer, 2007), and public management scholars 
have, until very recently, inexplicably, ignored the existence of international 
organizations, focusing exclusively on national and subnational governments .  This 
research is an attempt to bridge that gap by examining the issue of motivation of EC 
staff.  
Motivation is, of course, a complex and multidimensional concept.  In this 
paper, we focus on two related perspectives on motivation:  motivation for entry 
(what motivates people to seek out and accept a position within the organization) and 
public service motivation.  Public service motivation research posits that the choice to 
work in the public or non-profit sectors reflects a set of values, a desire to do work 
that is socially meaningful and that allows the individual to serve a broader public 
interest.
While the specific concept of public service motivation has not previously 
been applied to the European Commission, some scholars have applied closely-related 
concepts.  For example, Hooghe (2001) describes the process of self-selection, 
sometimes based on a strong personal attraction to “European integration as a 
momentous and positive development” (52).  She also recognizes the tension between 
more idealistic and instrumental motives of senior Commission officials.
The goals of our research were threefold.  First, we aimed to develop a basic 
measure of public service motivation to ascertain whether this concept was 
meaningful within the context of the European Commission.  Second, we examined 3
two separate but related measures, entry motivation and public service motivation, as 
dependent variables and analyzed demographic factors that might predict both entry 
motivation and public service motivation in individuals.  Finally, we used these 
findings to test some of the conventional wisdom – stereotypes about motivation held 
broadly both external to and within the EC.  
THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION
Public service motivation refers to the motivation to contribute to society and 
to the general interest. It has been described as one of the big questions of public 
management (Behn, 1995). In their seminal piece, Perry and Wise (1990 : 368) for 
the first time defined public service motivation formally as ‘an individual’s 
predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public 
institutions and organizations’. This definition focuses on the unique features of 
government that might drive individuals perform public service.  Brewer and Selden 
(1998) defined public service motivation as ‘the motivating force that makes 
individuals deliver significant public service’, whereas Rainey and Steinbauer (1999), 
who see public service motivation as an important determinant of organizational 
performance, defined public service motivation as a ‘general altruistic motivation to 
serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation or humanity’. 
A number of authors (mostly non-American) have studied similar motivational 
concepts without specifically applying the term ‘public service motivation’. While 
Chanlat (2003) writes about ‘l’éthique du bien commun (the common interest ethic)’ 
in a Canadian context, British scholars talk about the ‘public service ethos’ 
(Woodhouse 1997; Pratchett and Wingfield 1996). Also in France ( Bodiguel 1986;
Kessler 1985), Germany (Hattenhauer 1993), and the Netherlands (van Raaij, Vinken 
and van Dun 2002), a set of public values has been shown to motivate public servants.4
Based on rational, norm-based and affective grounds, Perry (1996) detected 
four dimensions of public service motivation: attraction to policy making, 
commitment to the public interest and civic duty, compassion and self-sacrifice. 
These are general public values that have been corroborated as a basis for public 
service motivation throughout the Western world (Camilleri 2006; Vandenabeele
2008a), as these cultures share, to some extent, a common Greco-Judean background 
and have developed similar political cultures and public institutions (Raadschelders 
2003). However, Vandenabeele (2008a), has demonstrated another public service 
motivation dimension, democratic governance, which refers to administrative values 
in democratic governance systems.
2
Public service motivation has been shown to relate to job and organizational 
performance (Naff  and Crum 1999; Lewis and Alonso 2001, Kim 2005; 
Vandenabeele 2009), sectoral and employer preference ( Lewis and Frank 2002; 
Vandenabeele 2008b), decreased turnover and increased job satisfaction (Naff and 
Crum 1999), incentive preferences (Rainey 1982) and whistle-blowing (Brewer and 
Selden 1998). 
As this list demonstrates, most of the empirical work on public service 
motivation has been concerned with the outcomes of public sector motivation, while 
only a few authors have addressed its origins.  The available empirical (Moynihan and 
Pandey 2007; Perry et al. 2008) and theoretical work (Perry 2000; Vandenabeele 
2007; Perry and Vandenabeele 2008) suggest that institutions play an important role 
in public service motivation development. An institution is defined as ‘a formal or 
informal, structural, societal or political phenomenon that transcends the individual 
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level, that is based on more or less common values, has a certain degree of stability 
and influences behavior’ (Peters 2000: 18).  Institutions are seen as responsible for the 
transmission of (public service) values to the individual’s identity as a member of the 
institution.  These can include, for example, family, school, or religious influences.
In addition to institutional (and organizational) antecedents,  Pandey and 
Stazyk (2008) also distinguish socio-demographic antecedents. These have been used
as control variables in multivariate studies (see for an overview, Pandey and Stazyk 
2008) or as independent variables ( DeHart-Davis et al. 2006;  Perry 1997;  Camilleri 
2007;  Bright 2005). Gender, age, education, minority status or political affiliation 
have been among the most frequently-cited demographic characteristics which are 
related to individual public service motivation levels. Education has probably the 
most robust correlation with public service motivation (Pandey and Stazyk 2008). 
Education, as an important social institution, plays an important socializing role in 
public service motivation (Perry 1997 & 2000). Age is also an important demographic 
antecedent of public service motivation, with older employees generally showing a 
higher level of public service motivation. Concerning the influence of gender on 
public service motivation, the current evidence is mixed, according to Pandey and 
Stazyk (2008). Only with regard to one dimension, compassion, do women 
consistently report higher compassion levels. 
Public service motivation is, of course, not the sole motivation of employees 
working in the public sector. It is only one of the multiple motives that explain 
organizational behavior in public service or governmental organizations.  The other 
components of public sector motivation include, among others, job security, 
retirement pay or pension rights, salary, promotion opportunities and work-family 
balance. (Lewis and Frank 2002). 6
Further, an individual’s motivations may shift over time or in relation to 
different behaviors.  As Herbert Simon (1976) noted, the motivation to accept a job 
can be quite different than the motivation that is evoked on a day-to-day basis. 
However, based upon institutional and identity-based approaches of public service 
motivation, one can assume that the initial motivation to join affects the motivation 
for other types of behavior and that the underlying variable is a stable ‘public service 
identity’. This is also related to the discussion of whether public service motivation is 
something one brings to the organization or whether this type of motivation develops 
over the course of employment in the organization (Vandenabeele 2008b). 
Although there is now a quite large body of research on public service 
motivation in both the United States and Western European contexts, (Perry and 
Hondeghem 2008), the focus has remained at the level of national, state or local 
governments.  To date, no research on public service motivation has been done within 
an international organization.  On the one hand, international organizations share 
many of the characteristics that are found within national or local public 
organizations, not in the least a mission that is aimed at creating public value.  This 
particular element makes it intuitively easy to relate public service motivation to the 
work environment of an international organization. On the other hand, there are some 
characteristics of international organizations which make them markedly different 
from the typical governance structures found at the national, state or local level, in 
particular the lack of direct contact with the citizens served or affected by policy.  
Therefore, although public service motivation can be conceptually linked to 
international organizations, it is an interesting empirical question whether and how 
public service motivation is found to operate within this environment. 
RESEARCH METHODS7
The data used for this paper were gathered by means of a survey (distributed 
as a web-based survey) to all employees of the European Commission by DG 
Personnel and Administration, as part of their annual satisfaction survey.  The 
response rate was 28 percent, resulting in 6950 usable forms.  The authors of this 
paper provided the questions on motivation for this survey.
Public service motivation is one of the main variables of this study. It was 
operationalized by means of a set of items derived from the instrument developed by 
Vandenabeele (2008a).  Due to space constraints as well as the need to tailor the 
questions to the work environment of the European Commission, only eight questions 
could be selected from the 18-item instrument originally developed.  Thus, rather than 
a questionnaire exploring in detail all of the five dimensions developed by 
Vandenabeele (2008a), we have constructed a composite public service motivation -
scale by averaging the score on a select set of public service motivation items in the 
dataset.  Such an approach has been frequently applied in public service motivation
research.. Brewer and Selden (2000), Naff and Crum (1999) and Kim (2005) used 
similar instruments, with one item representing each dimension of public service 
motivation, apart from the dimension ‘politics and policies’ (only measured in Naff 
and Crum 1999). Lewis and Frank (2002) averaged the score of two items (‘A job that 
allows to help other people’ and ‘A job that is useful to society’) to construct a 
measure of public service motivation.
In our instrument, six items were used to measure public service motivation. 
However, as the instrument had to fit the reality of an international organization, the 
dimension ’interest in politics and policy-making’ and ‘compassion’ were not 
included in this instrument. Questions 1 through 3 measure general public interest, 
questions 4 and 5 address the dimension of self-sacrifice, and question 6 focuses on 8
democratic governance. With a Cronbach’s α of .71, this instrument is sufficiently 
internally consistent and therefore methodologically sound. 
TABLE 1. : Measurement instrument for public service motivation
Items
Q1. Serving the European public interest is an important drive in my daily life (at work or outside work) 
Q2. What I do should contribute to the welfare of European citizens
Q3. To me, serving the European public interest is more important than helping individual persons 
Q4. I am prepared to make important sacrifices for the good of the European Union 
Q5. Making a difference in European society means more to me than personal achievements 
Q6. It is important that officials account for the resources that are used 
In addition to public service motivation, a number of variables were included 
as possible antecedents of public service motivation or control variables. These 
include gender, age (measured in categories, due to Commission anonymity 
requirements), nationality (grouped, for the regression analysis, by region in the EU), 
DG (grouped for analysis into a policy-coordinating group and an internally oriented 
group as two extremes and a residual group) and some individual work position 
characteristics. These were status (type of employment), function group (position 
within the organization) and whether or not people were in a management position. 
TABLE 2 : Demographic characteristics of the sample
Gender Directorate-general grouping
Male 3351 Internally oriented 1078
Female 3425 Policy-coordinating 297
Other 4843
Age group 
Up to 29 409 Status
30 to 39  2037 Permanent civil servant 5193
40 to 49 2572 Contract agent 1034
50 to 59 1438 Temporary 324
60 and older 197 Seconded national expert 175
Trainee 50
Region
North 3284 Function group
South 2099 AD 2877
CEE1* 517 AST 2580
CEE2 102 CA FG I 92
CEE3 149 CA FG II 281
CA FG III 230
Management position CA FG IV 353
Non-management position 6081 Other 124
Management position 695
*  CEE1 countries:  Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia; CEE2 countries: Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania; CEE3 countries: Romania, Bulgaria.9
Finally, a question was included that inquired about people’s initial 
motivations to join the European Commission.  Three of the responses provided for 
this closed-ended question can be conceptually linked to public service motivation (‘I 
am committed to building Europe’, ‘I wanted to be able to shape European policy’ 
and ‘I had strong interest in a specific policy area’), whereas one was of interest 
because it was, as a self-interested motive, the opposite of public service motivation 
(‘The remuneration and the benefits are good’).  These items will be able to cast a 
light on the stability of public service motivation throughout time and the debate on 
whether public service motivation originates from pre- or after entry processes. 
Although the survey items are ordinal in nature, the data will be analyzed by 
means of OLS regression. This is a common practice, as OLS is robust when 
sufficient categories are used (which is the case for the composite public service 
motivation instrument) and even preferable, as OLS results are easier to interpret. 
Also, it is easier to develop a hierarchical regression model with OLS.
3. 
A hierarchical regression analysis enables to assess the effect of the 
independent variables which are entered in each step of the analysis. In order to do so, 
the additional R² found above the R² of the previous step is statistically tested by 
means of an F-ratio (Hatcher and Stepanski 1994).  At each step of the analysis, 
independent variables are entered in sets.  These sets are based upon their relation to a 
particular conceptual variable.  The order in which the sets are entered in the analysis 
should reflect the presumed causal priority (in particular the temporal ordering) and 
the research relevance (Cohen and Cohen 1983). 
The analysis of the survey data is supplemented, where appropriate, with 
responses to open-ended questions in face-to-face interviews conducted by one of the 
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authors with 70 staff members of the European Commission in three DGs, 
Environment, Regional Policy, and Single Market and Services, from 2006 through 
2008 as part of a research project focusing on the impacts of enlargement and of the 
Kinnock reforms on organizational culture and management style in the 
Commission.
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We begin our analysis with an examination of the motivation for entry and 
then turn to the analysis of public service motivation.  
MOTIVATION FOR ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Research on the recruitment and hiring process makes clear the importance of 
values and motivation for actors on both sides of employment relationship; employers 
seek new staff who not only bring needed skills and experience but who also share a 
commitment to organizational values, while individuals seek out organizations with 
values congruent with their own (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005).  The degree of person-
organization fit on values is therefore seen as affecting both the organization’s ability 
to attract desirable candidates and successful outcomes for those hired (Leisink  and 
Steijn, 2008).
TABLE 3 MOTIVATION TO WORK FOR THE COMMISSION
Entry motivation N Percent
1 Build Europe 2743 39.5
2 Shape Eur. Policy 795 11.4
3 Specific policy area 622 8.9
4 Work in int'l org. 4148 59.7
5 Work is challenging and interesting 2310 33.2
6 Career enhancement 2203 31.7
7 Natural progression 687 9.9
8 Salary/benefits 3472 50
9 Personal/family 1378 19.8
N= 6950
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As table 3 shows, employees of the EC (including both permanent officials, 
temporary staff and contract agents, and detached national experts), report a range of 
motivations.  As respondents could choose up to three responses, the responses total 
well over 100 percent.  Motivations for entry can be seen as more altruistic or more 
instrumental.  A response such as “I am committed to building Europe” would be 
classed as highly altruistic, while responses such as “the remuneration and benefits 
are good,” or “for personal or family reasons” are clearly more instrumental.  
Some responses are difficult to categorize in this way.  While the desire for 
interesting and challenging work is not specifically altruistic, it can be considered an
intrinsic motivation, unlike a focus on salary and benefits.  Similarly, almost two-
thirds of those responding to the survey cited the desire to work in an international 
organization as one of their reasons for entering, a finding that is hardly surprising, 
since someone who did not find such a work environment appealing would not have 
been likely to self-select (i.e., to apply), and since the concours (the test for entry), 
which is highly competitive, clearly favors individuals who already have international 
experience and will thus adapt easily to the EC’s work environment (Ban,2008).  But 
without context, this response is difficult to categorize as either altruistic or 
instrumental.  
If we combine the first three responses, we see that almost 60 percent of 
respondents gave as one of their choices a more altruistic reason for entering, while 
42% saw working for the EC as a way of advancing their career, or as a natural 
progression from their studies, and half identified the salary and benefits as one of the 
attractions.  Finally, about 20 percent came for personal or family reasons.  In sum, 
more people identified either altruistic motives or the desire to work in an 
international environment than salary or benefits.  This sheds light on the debate over 12
whether people develop a public service motivation through earlier socialization or 
whether it is nurtured within the organization.  It is clear that, for many of those 
working within the EC, these values contributed to their desire to work within the 
European institutions.
An examination of the responses to an open-ended question in personal 
interviews provides us with a more nuanced view of the dynamics and 
interrelationships of these motivations.  First, when responding to an open-ended 
question, a smaller percentage of people volunteered that salary and benefits were an 
important motivation for them.  This may, of course, be a social desirability bias, i.e., 
some people may see this as an inappropriate response.  Second, most people had 
mixed motives, even those who entered with strongly altruistic values.  In the 
following, we see, in fact, an interplay of virtually the full range of responses:
[I entered for] several reasons.  One, I think it's typical of the people I would 
characterize as of the old guard, because actually I still believe in the 
European ideal., but secondly, there are not many departments where I could 
have worked, from the point of view of my background.  And Environment 
was the place I wanted to be.  And thirdly, once you are in here, it is one of the 
most stimulating places you could possibly work in the world.  And I think if 
any commission official doesn't also mention the salary, then they are lying.  I 
think that still is my motivation.  I think [for] a significant number of the 
colleagues I meet in the commission and from other DGs, there is still a high 
degree of idealism and motivation in the commission services. [entry date
1986.]
Age and length of service both have some effect on entry motivation.  It is not 
uncommon to hear within the Commission that the younger generation is just not as 13
idealistic as the old-timers, a stereotype that is shared by the respondent quoted above  
Since some quite senior people are recent arrivals, as a result of enlargement, length 
of service should be the better measure of whether the “old guard” holds different 
values, but the measure used by the Commission uses categories that are not ideal for 
this analysis, as they end at “more than 15 years” of service,” so we have also 
included here the analysis by age, which breaks out those older than 60.  An 
examination of the two helps shed light on changing motivation.
Table 4a:  Entry level motivation by years of service
Entry motivation TOTAL < 
1yr
<2 
yrs
2-4 
yrs
5-7 
yrs
8-10 
yr
11-
15
>15
1 Build Europe 39.5 36 36 39 39 38 42 42
2 Shape Eur. policy 11.4 12 13 12 12 13 12 9
3 Specific policy area 8.9 12 12 10 8 10 9 6
4 Work in int'l org. 59.7 55 61 60 35 38 64 56
5 Work is challenging  33.2 37 32 35 35 32 33 32
6 Career 
enhancement
31.7 43 40 32 29 28 28 29
7 Natural progression 9.9 13 11 11 10 10 9 7
8 Salary/benefits 50 40 42 47 49 52 53 41
9 Personal/family 19.8 22 24 21 23 20 16 18
Table 4b: Entry motivation by age
Entry motivation TOTAL to 
29
30-
39
40-
49
50-
59
60+
1 Build Europe 39.5 36 38 39 41 51
2 Shape Eur. policy 11.4 12 12 11 11 12
3 Specific policy area 8.9 11 9 9 9 14
4 Work in int'l org. 59.7 53 62 62 56 48
5 Work is challenging and interesting 33.2 33 32 34 33 32
6 Career enhancement 31.7 45 34 30 29 27
7 Natural progression 9.9 21 14 8 5 8
8 Salary/benefits 50 45 48 51 56 48
9 Personal/family 19.8 11 20 21 22 24
First, an examination of the number saying that they entered because they 14
wanted to participate in building Europe finds a moderate difference by years of 
service, but a much sharper difference by age, especially among the oldest group; 
among those over 60 still working, over half identify building Europe as a reason for 
joining.  On the other hand, those who are younger and recently hired are more likely 
to say that career enhancement was a motive for joining the European Commission.  
Of course, one needs to be aware of the questionable accuracy of recall data, 
especially over a long period of time, but, taken together, this is moderate support for 
the hypothesis that entry motivation of new staff has changed over time.  But we 
should be careful about interpreting it in this way because in virtually every study of 
motivation, there is a generational effect, with older employees identifying with more 
idealistic values.  Whether this is a natural function of aging or a generational effect is 
not clear, but the findings in the Commission are in line with previous research in 
national governments.  It is also interesting to note that salary and benefits were not 
ranked higher by younger or newer staff, who were much more likely than older staff 
to value working in an international environment.
There is one pattern that emerges, both in the survey results and in the 
interviews, one that reflects the changing nature of the EU itself.  Far from a new 
experiment, it has become an established organization, the importance of which is 
well-understood.  And this has led to an increasing number of academic programs 
focusing specifically on EU law, politics and policy, and economics.  These programs 
spread rapidly in the new member states, attracting a significant number of students 
even before accession and providing a natural feeder group ready to apply for 
positions in the European institutions (Ban, 2008).  In addition, the new member 
states of central and eastern Europe had large staffs within their governments working 
specifically on the complex negotiations necessary for admission.  So the younger 15
entrants are more likely to specify that they see working within the Commission as a 
natural progression, either from their studies or from their working within their 
government.  As one explained: 
Well, one thing was the studies.  I mean I always wanted to work for the 
European Union because of languages, because I learned two languages, I 
wanted to use them and practice; that was when I was smaller.  So the idea 
was already there but for different reasons maybe, and then, well, having 
studied European politics I was obviously very interested.  I did a research 
thesis on Polish accession negotiations and obviously for a Pole, as for all the 
new member states, it is a very exciting period of time because it is entering 
the European and we come as a new wave; and obviously for us being the 
right age and right situation it was just a great opportunity.  So that’s why I 
took the concours and that’s why I wanted to work in Brussels.
There was a small group (both among those entering before 2004 and, in a 
very few cases, among newer entrants) who seemed to have fallen into their positions 
more or less by accident.  In fact, one person told me he had entered “By chance.  I 
aw the ads and said “OK, let’s try it.”  Another described this process at more length 
(both the pull of interesting work and the push of wanting to leave his current job): 
It was like many such decisions taken a little bit -- there was a series of events: 
I wanted to make a move, I knew some people who were working here, and I 
thought it sounded interesting, and I just happened to see an advertisement for 
a concours for lawyers to come to the Commission.  So I thought I would have 
a go at it, and then it just went on from there really.  It’s a slow process, and 
eventually I passed the concours, and I wasn’t so happy in my job, and we 
decided to make the move.16
TABLE 5  ENTRY-LEVEL MOTIVATION BY FUNCTION GROUP
Entry motivation TOTAL AD AST
1 Build Europe 39.5 46 35
2 Shape Eur. Policy 11.4 19 4
3 Specific policy area 8.9 13 3
4 Work in int'l org. 59.7 58 63
5 Work is challenging and interesting 33.2 37 27
6 Career enhancement 31.7 25 36
7 Natural progression 9.9 14 5
8 Salary/benefits 50 48 58
9 Personal/family 19.8 14 26
Reported reasons for entry vary by function group.  This is quite logical, as 
those in assistant or secretarial positions (AST) will, in reality, have much less direct 
impact on policy than administrators (AD), who report a higher interest in building 
Europe, although it is important to note that over one-third of AST do see building 
Europe as part of the reason for working in the EC.  AST, predictably, don’t see their 
roles as shaping policy or working in a specific policy area but, on the other hand, 
place a higher value on the tangible rewards of salary and benefits.  Women also 
report more instrumental reasons for joining, but this is entirely a function of their 
organizational role, i.e., of the fact that far more women are in AST positions, where 
they have little direct policy responsibility.
PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION
The overall level of public service motivation among European Commission 
staff is moderately high.  The mean score of 3.91 is very similar to or even higher 
than that found in many national governments (Vandenabeele 2009; Brewer and 
Selden 2000; Naff and Crum 1999). 
Table 6.  Mean scores of PUBLIC SERVICE 
MOTIVATION (general, gender, age)
General 3,91
Gender Male 3,96
Female 3,8717
Age Up to 29 3,83
30 to 39  3,86
40 to 49 3,93
50 to 59 3,97
60 and older 3,99
Table 7.  Mean score of PUBLIC SERVICE 
MOTIVATION (status, function)
Status Permanent Official 3,92
Contract Agent 3,89
Temporary 3,89
Seconded National Expert 4,05
Trainee 3,91
Function AD 4,04
AST 3,79
CA FGI 3,81
CA FGII 3,79
CA FGIII 3,87
CA FGIV 4,00
The differences in the level of public service motivation across different types 
of positions in the Commission (both the status and the function group) are not large, 
and they are in the expected direction.  As with entry motivation, administrators, as 
well as contract agents at function group IV (who do work comparable to that of 
administrators) show higher levels of public service motivation than do those with 
technical or support staff roles.
Table 8.  Mean scores of PUBLIC SERVICE 
MOTIVATION (DG)
OIL 3,67 EAC 3,89 SANCO 3,94
PMO 3,72 ESTAT 3,89 COMP 3,95
TAXUD 3,75 TEN-T EA 3,89 ENTR 3,95
DIGIT 3,77 MARE 3,90 RELEX 3,96
BUDG 3,79 JRC 3,90 MARKT 3,96
DGT 3,79 TREN 3,91 AGRI 3,96
EPSO 3,82 SCIC 3,91 EACEA 3,98
OPOCE 3,83 OIB 3,91 JLS 3,98
ECHO 3,84 AIDCO 3,93 ENV 3,99
IAS 3,85 REGIO 3,94 SG 3,99
EMPL 3,87 COMM 3,94 RTD 4,00
ADMIN 3,88 ELARG 3,94 OLAF 4,02
ECFIN 3,88 INFSO 3,94 SJ 4,03
DEV 3,89 EACI 3,94 TRADE 4,0318
There is a moderately high range in responses by DG, with a low of 3,72 and 
a high of 4,03.    DGs and services with internal administrative functions score, on 
average, somewhat lower than policy-oriented DGs, This may be evidence that public 
service motivation is inculcated within the organization, as a result of a strong 
commitment to the mission.  This supports previous research , which has shown that 
organizational culture reflects the mission of the individual DG (Cini, 1997).
Table 9.  Mean scores of PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION (nationality, country 
grouping)
Czech 3,60 Estonian 3,85 Italian 3,98 EU-15 3,92
Slovenian 3,63 Hungarian 3,86 Slovakian 4,00 EU-10 3,80
Lithuanian 3,67 Irish 3,91 Swedish 4,00 EU-2 3,92
Finnish 3,71 Romanian 3,91 Portuguese 4,01
Latvian 3,76 Dutch 3,91 German 4,02
Polish 3,79 French 3,93 Greek 4,02
Luxembourgian 3,82 Spanish 3,93 Austrian 4,03
Belgian 3,83 Bulgarian 3,93 Maltese 4,14
Danish 3,84 British 3,94 Cypriot 4,24
If the differences across DGs indicate a socialization effect within the 
organization, differences by nationality may reflect early learning and differences at 
the level of national culture, as there is a relatively high range in public service 
motivation across nationalities, from a low of 3,60 to a high of 4,26.  But discerning 
the patterns here are not easy, given the large number of current member states.  
There is no clear north-south split on public service motivation.   There is, however, 
some confirmation of the perception that the new staff coming from the Central and 
Eastern European countries have lower levels of public service motivation, but this is 
true only for the EU-10 countries (those that entered in 2004), while the new staff 
from Romania and Bulgaria, the EU-2 countries that joined only in 2007, show 
responses at the same level as EU-15.
5
                                                
5  The material above on public service motivation is adapted from the analysis done by the authors for 
the report on the 2008 Annual Staff Opinion Survey among Commission Staff, forthcoming, European 
Commission Directorate-General Personnel and Administration.19
To gain a more sophisticated picture of the dynamics of public service 
motivation, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis (see table 10), which 
enables us to look at the total effect of a range of possible antecedents of public 
service motivation.A three-step hierarchical model is applied, where in the first step 
demographic variables are entered, in the second step organizational variables are 
entered and in third step the motivation for entry is entered. 
The results of the analysis in step 1 demonstrate that although the model is 
significant, the explanatory power of the analysis is very weak, with an R² of .01. 
There are small effects for gender (females tend to score lower), age (older employees 
tend to score higher) and region (compared to citizens of Northern and Western 
European countries, inhabitants of the CEE1-countries, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia, score lower).
In step 2, where organizational variables are added, the R² is increased to .05. 
The F-ratio indicates that this is a significant increase in explained variance. 
Employees who occupy a management position tend to score higher on public service 
motivation.  With regard to the DG in which one is employed, the analysis shows that 
those employed in an internally oriented DG score lower, whereas employees of 
policy-coordinating DG’s tend to score higher.  None of the contract statuses seem to 
have an influence on public service motivation levels, but compared to the AD staff,20
TABLE 10 : Hierarchical regression of public service motivation
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Variable β Β β
(St. err.) (St. err.) (St. err.)
Gender (female) -0,078 *** -0,009 -0,002
0,017 0,018 0,017
Age group 0,038 *** 0,040 *** 0,040 ***
0,010 0,010 0,010
South 0,055 ** 0,041 * 0,012
0,019 0,019 0,018
CEE1 -0,084 * -0,116 *** -0,082 *
0,034 0,034 0,032
CEE2 -0,115 -0,157 * -0,115
0,070 0,070 0,066
CEE3 0,069 0,048 0,069
0,059 0,059 0,056
Management position 0,093 *** 0,071 **
0,028 0,027
Internally oriented DG -0,119 *** -0,079 ***
0,023 0,022
Policy coordinating DG 0,081 * 0,062
0,041 0,039
Contract agent 0,001 0,021
0,054 0,051
Seconded national expert 0,078 0,044
0,054 0,051
Temporary 0,044 0,066 *
0,041 0,040
Trainee 0,152 0,138
0,105 0,100
AST -0,238 *** -0,153 ***
0,020 0,019
CA_I -0,182 * -0,084
0,084 0,080
CA_II -0,202 ** -0,130 *
0,064 0,061
CA_III -0,125 -0,113
0,068 0,065
CA_IV -0,010 -0,028
0,064 0,061
FG_Other -0,309 *** -0,256 ***
0,059 0,057
Building Europe 0,341 ***
0,017
Shape European Policy 0,225 ***
0,026
Interest in specific policy 0,133 ***
0,028
Pay and benefits -0,121 ***
0,017
N 6485 6485 6485
F 12,82 *** 17,38 *** 46,16 ***
R² 0,012 0,049 0,141
Adj, R² 0,011 0,046 0,138
F-ratio - 19,29 *** 173,96 ***21
AST, CA I and CAII employees and a residual category score significantly lower.  An 
interesting finding is that the effect of region is enhanced in this step, as CEE2 nations 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) also tend to score lower on public service motivation. 
The third and last step of the hierarchical model adds an additional .10 to the R², 
resulting in an explained variance of .14, which is, according to the F-ratio, a 
significant increase.  In this step, the motivation for entry is incorporated in the 
model.  The findings demonstrate that those entering for reasons that are associated 
with ‘Building Europe’, ‘Shaping European policy’ and ‘Interest in a particular 
policy-field’ score higher on public service motivation, whereas those who enter for 
the salary and benefits tend to score lower on public service motivation. Some of the 
previous effects are controlled for when these variables are entered into the 
regression, which could point to a mediation effect. 
DISCUSSION
Testing  the conventional wisdom:  
Conversation between Carolyn Ban and a staff person at the Catholic 
University of Leuven:
Ban:  I am here in Belgium studying the motivation of staff within the 
European Commission:
Staff member: (with a sniff)  Eh, they make so much money, do they need to 
be motivated?
As the small interaction reported above exemplifies, the perception among 
many EU citizens is that the staff of the EC are well paid, probably overly so, and 
that, of course, it is the salary and benefits that drive people to work for the EC.  As 
we have seen, in all measures of entry motivation, both qualitative and quantitative, 
salary and benefits are recognized as good, but they are hardly the only reason or even 
a main reason for coming to work at the EC.  Further, if EC staff were primarily “in it 
for the money,” one would expect their levels of public service motivation to be lower 22
than that of civil servants in national or regional governments, who are paid relatively 
less, but that is not the case.  EC staff show levels of public service motivation that 
are quite comparable to, or even higher than, those found in governments.  As we 
have seen, many do see coming to the EC as a good career move, but within that 
broad category are those who are motivated by the challenge of the work and by an 
interest in taking their work on specific policy issues to a higher level.  
There are also two related pieces of conventional wisdom held by many within 
the Commission itself.  The first is that the founders, the early pioneers, were really 
committed to building Europe, while those entering later are careerists, who don’t 
have the same kind of passion for the institution.  Of course, the real pioneers, who 
entered within the first ten or fifteen years, have all retired and will not show up in 
this study, but the very oldest group still working, those over 60, have higher levels of 
public service motivation and are more likely to report that they entered because they 
wanted to participate in building Europe (although that number is still only barely 
over 50 percent).  But since age has been positively correlated with public service 
motivation in previous studies, this may not necessarily indicate a serious problem for 
the organization, as it may indicate that the organization can successfully reinforce 
public service motivation through socialization that extends through the staff 
member’s career.  
The second item of folk wisdom is that salaries are so low in the new member 
states, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe, that, of course, most people 
entering as a result of the recent enlargements are, indeed, motivated by the money.  
This attitude is fairly wide-spread and not at all appreciated, as this senior manager 
who had recently joined the Commission from a new member state made clear:23
The whole sort of unstated attitude is “Oh, you guys are living on 200 Euros a 
month and so you should be so incredibly happy and lucky, and put up with 
any administrative abuse because we are so well compensated.”  Well, I took a 
pay cut to come here, and from a long-term perspective, a very significant cut.  
So there is no sugarcoating of that for me…This whole sort of attitude, you 
hear it from my people day in and day out; they have all been brainwashed 
into it.
In fact, our data do not support the hypothesis that those entering from the new 
member states are attracted primarily by the high salaries..  While more recent 
entrants are more likely to report that they entered to enhance their careers, they are 
not more likely than earlier entrants to focus specifically on salary and benefits.  And 
they are clearly more likely than those with longer seniority to be motivated by the 
desire to work in an international organization.  
An understanding of public service motivation is useful not only for testing 
some of the “conventional wisdom” within the Commission but, more importantly, 
for enhancing its management.  Over the past five years, the Commission has 
undergone a major reform of its management systems (Hussein 2008), and the 
European Personnel Selection Office is currently making significant changes in the 
competition, i.e., the testing process used to select staff for the European institutions 
(Ban, 2008a ).  And the Secretary General recently appointed three committees to 
examine further modernization of the management of the Commission, one of which, 
headed by Jörgen Homquist, Director General of DG Single Market and Services, was 
charged with looking at issues of motivation in the Commission.  While the report of 
the committee has never been released, a summary of the three reports was recently 
published by Graspe (2009) An understanding of public service motivation can lead 24
to better selection processes that can identify the candidates with desired values and to 
a more effective approach to both feedback and incentive systems.  
In sum, public service motivation is a useful conceptual tool in international 
settings as well as in national and subnational governments and NGOs.  In future 
research, we will examine public service motivation as an independent variable, 
looking at its effects on such attitudes and values as job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment.  
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